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The California Open Primary Act Unconstitutionally
Burdens Political Parties' Associational Rights:
California Democratic Party v. Jones
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

ELECTIONS -

FIRST AMENDMENT -

RIGHT OF

ASSOCIATION - The Supreme Court of the United States held that a
State may not implement an open primary system that unreasonably burdens political parties' associational rights that are guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
California DemocraticParty v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
In March of 1996, California voters overwhelmingly adopted Proposition 198 - the Open Primary Act ("OPA"). 1 The OPA transformed the California state primary election system from a closed
primary system to a blanket primary format.2 California joined a
small minority of states in adopting a blanket primary system.3 In
an open or blanket primary system all eligible voters may vote for
any political candidate regardless of the voters' or candidates' political party affiliation. 4 After its passage via Proposition 198, the OPA
5
was codified under California Law.
The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party,
1. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F Supp. 1288 (E.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 169
F3d. 646 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000). Proposition 198 passed by a large margin: 59.51 percent voted in favor of the Open Primary Act, while only 40.49 percent of eligible voters voted in opposition. Id.
2. CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F Supp. at 1290. Proposition 198 effectively ended
the closed primary system in California that had been in place for 87 years, beginning in
1909 when California substituted primary elections for nominating conventions held by the
individual political parties. Id.
3. Id. at 1291. Alaska, Louisiana, and Washington are the only other states that have
implemented blanket primaries. Id.
4. Id. at 1291-92. Primary elections fall into three general classes: Closed Primary,
Open Primary, and Blanket Primary. Closed Primary voters declare a party preference some
time prior to voting and then only vote for a candidate in the party they have chosen to affiliate with; Open Primary voters may only vote for one party but make the choice of party
affiliation at the time of voting in the privacy of the polling booth; Blanket Primary voters
may vote for any candidate in any race that they are eligible to vote in. See JOHN F. BmY,
POLMCS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS INAMERICA 133-37 (3d ed. 1996).
5. CAL ELEc. CODE § 2001 (West Supp. 2000). All persons entitled to vote, including
those not affiliated with any political party, shall have the right to vote, except as otherwise
provided by law, at any election in which they are qualified to vote, for any candidate
regardless of the candidate's political affiliation. Id.
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the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom
Party filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California, alleging that the California statute promulgated under the OPA violated their right of association guaranteed
by the First Amendment of the Constitution.6 The parties brought
suit against the California Secretary of State seeking a declaration
that Proposition 198 is unconstitutional and requesting an injunction against its implementation. 7 The political action group "Califor8
nians for an Open Primary" also intervened as a party defendant.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California awarded judgment to the defendants on the basis that the
State's interest in eliminating factionalism 9 outweighed the burdens
imposed by the blanket primary on the associational rights of the
political parties. 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court and elected to adopt
the opinion of the district court as its own." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 2 to consider the issue of whether
the State of California may, consistent with the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of association, implement a "blanket primary"
to decide a political party's nominee in the State's general election. 13 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
6. California Democratic Party, 984 F Supp. at 1292. The First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an established religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
7. CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F Supp. at 1288.
8. CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 120 S. Ct. at 2406 (2000).
9. Factionalism is derived from faction, which is defined as "[tihe term used by James
Madison in Federalist 10 to describe 'a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.' " THE DORSEY DICnoNARY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLMCS
207 (1988). For a discussion concerning the problem of factionalism and its deeply rooted
history, see THE FEDERALISr No. 10 (James Madison).

10. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 984 F Supp. at 1305.
11. California Democratic Party, 169 F.3d 646, 647 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct.
2402 (2000). "We have reviewed the briefs to this Court, the record made before the district
court, and the careful, detailed, and eloquent opinion of the district court. Because we concur in it in every respect, we have elected to adopt it as the opinion of our Court." Id.
12. Certiorari is "[a] writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an inferior
court requiring the latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein, ...
[The term is] [miost commonly used to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States,
which uses the writ of certiorari as a discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to
hear." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
13. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2405.
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reversed the decisions of the lower courts and found the OPA to be
4
unconstitutional. 1
In ruling for the petitioners, 15 the Court agreed with the respondents that the states do have a major role in structuring elections,
including primaries. 6 However, in so doing, Justice Scalia reasoned
that the method by which parties make their nominations are not
wholly public affairs that states are free to regulate. 7 Further,
Scalia contended that the dissent, which argued that primaries are
forms of state action, misinterpreted the Court's decisions in Smith
v. Alright and Terry v. Adams. 8 The Court also noted that when
States do regulate the internal processes of political parties they
are bound by the constraints of the United States Constitution and
its amendments.1 9 Among these protections guaranteed to political
parties by the Constitution is the First Amendment's freedom of
association.2 0
The Court stressed the great importance that political parties
place on the selection of their nominees. 21 In addition, the major14. Id. at 2414.
15. Id. at 2406.
16. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2407. The Supreme Court cited several
prior decisions where States were given control to regulate their systems of elections, including Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 478 U.S. 208,
217 (1986); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); and Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51
(1973).
17. /d. at 2407. The Court held that primary elections are not wholly public affairs and,
hence, not completely within the States' ability to regulate. Id. On this subject, Justice Scalia
stated, "[wihen the election determines a party's nominee it is a party affair as well, and, as
the cases to be discussed in text demonstrate, the constitutional rights of those composing
the party cannot be disregarded." Id. at n.4.
18. Id. In Allright the Court invalidated a rule limiting primaries to whites on the basis
that "[wihen a state prescribes an election process that gives a special role to political parties, it 'endorses, adopts and enforces discrimination... so that the parties' discriminatory
action becomes state action under the Fifteenth Amendment.' " Id. (quoting Smith v. Allright,
321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)). Scala's interpretation was that the decisions in Altright and Terry
do not stand for the proposition that party affairs are public, and, therefore, are devoid of
any protections under the Constitution and its amendments. Id. See also Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953).
19. California DemocraticParty, 120 S. Ct. at 2407. The Court cites several decisions
in which the constitutional limits of a State's regulatory power over a political party's internal affairs are reflected, including Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989); and Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107
(1981).
20. California Democratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2408. The Court recognized that "The
First Amendment protects 'the freedom to join together in furtherance of common political
beliefs.' " (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214-15). Id.
21. Id. at 2408. (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)).
Justice Stevens stated in his dissent that "a party's choice of a candidate is the most effec-
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ity 22 emphasized

the importance and protection that the First
Amendment affords the nomination process. 23 In doing so, the
Court interpreted its decision in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex
rel. La Follette to stand for the proposition that state interests supporting an open primary could not justify an intrusion into the parties' associational guarantees. 24 In refuting the dissent's argument
that a political party has no right to exclude, Justice Scalia pointed
out the "nonsensical" result that would ensue when the dissent's
rule combined with the Court's holding in Tashjian v. Republican
Party.25
The Court stated that the policy reasons behind its decision rest
primarily on the imminent fear that members of an opposing party
will determine a party's nominee. 26 The opinion asserted that crossover 27 voting of non-party members could result in the selection of
a party's nominee by members of an opposing political party.28 The
majority's view of the effects of crossover voting distinctly contrative way in which that party can communicate to the voters what the party represents and,
thereby, attract voter interest and support." Id.
22. Id. at 2405. The majority in CaliforniaDemocratic Party v. Jones included Chief
Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. Id.
23. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2408 (citing Eu, 489 U.S. at 224).
24. Id. In La Follette, the state of Wisconsin conducted an open presidential primary.
Id. Wisconsin law required the party delegates to vote in accordance with the open primary
results at the ensuing caucus. Id. Even though the primary did not directly nominate the candidate, the forced voting by the delegates at the caucus reached the same result. Id. The
selection of a candidate by non-party members violated the Democratic Party's ruies. Id. The
Court held in La Follette that "[wihatever the strength of the state interests supporting the
open primary itself, they could not justify this 'substantial intrusion into the associational
freedom of members of the National Party.' " Id.
25. Id. at n.7. Tashjian held that the First Amendment protects the right of a political
party to invite voters from outside the party to select the party's nominee. Id. This, combined with the nile that a party has no right to exclude, would result in allowing outsiders to
select a party's nominee. Id. This result would abolish the constitutional right of a party to
reserve the selection of candidates to its own membership. Id. In rejecting this result the
majority stated, "The First Amendment would thus guarantee a party's right to lose its identity, but not to preserve it." Id.
26. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2410. Justice Scalia asserted that the
selection of a party's nominee by the opposing party is an imminent and dangerous possibility of the blanket primary process. Id. In so ruling, Scalia relied on evidence of crossover
voting in Washington state primaries provided by an expert witness. Id. The expert testified
that crossover voting can rise to as high as twenty-five percent in primary elections. Id.
27. CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 169 F3d at 656. A "crossover voter" is defined as one
"[wiho votes for a candidate of a party which the voter is not registered. Thus, the crossover
voter could be an independent voter or one who is registered to a competing party." Id.
28. CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 120 S. Ct. at 2410. The Court realized that crossover
voting effects smaller political parties to a higher magnitude than the larger parties. Id. In
some races in California, the primary votes cast for the Libertarian Party and the Peace and
Freedom party doubled the total number of registered members of the parties. Id.
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dicts the Ninth Circuit's conclusion on the subject.29 The Court also
contended that a party's nominees under a blanket primary system
would have to take more moderate positions in order to appeal to
mass voters and secure the party's nomination. 30 Justice Scalia
pointed out that Proposition 198 circumvents the candidate selec31
tion process, which is the "basic function of a political party."
This circumvention of the candidate selection process results in not
only a loss of associational rights, but also reaches the intended
32
result of altering the party's message.
To meet the requirements of the Constitution, any interference
into a political party's associational freedom must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interestY. The respondents
advanced seven state interests that they thought sufficiently compelling to ensure the constitutionality of Proposition 198 under the
standard set by the Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party.34 The Court found that only four of the seven interests
advanced by the respondents had the possibility of being compelling, but determined that in the circumstances of this case those
four were not compelling.3 In addition to determining that Proposition 198 did not advance a compelling state interest, the Court also
29. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the possibility of malevolent crossover voting, or
raiding, was slight. Id. The circuit court also found that even though there would be a high
percentage of "benevolent" crossover voting, the crossover voting would only be determinative in an insignificant amount of races. Id.
30. Id. at 2411. In deciding that party nominees would have to moderate their positions
in order to obtain a nomination under the blanket primary system, the Court relied on the
expert report of Elisabeth R. Gerber. Id. In her expert report, Ms. Gerber stated that "the
policy positions of Members of Congress elected from blanket primary states are.., more
moderate, both in the absolute sense and relative to the other party, and so are more reflective of the preferences of mass voters at the center of the ideological spectrum." Id. Also,
the majority found the very purpose of Proposition 198 was to secure more moderate candidates through the blanket primary system. Id.
31. Id. at 2412.
32. California Democratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2412. The Court "[could] think of no
heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom then changing a party's message."
Id.
33. Id. In Timmons the Court held that "Regulations imposing severe burdens on [parties'] rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest." Timmons,
520 U.S. at 358.
34. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2413. The seven state interests advanced
by the respondents included producing elected officials who better represent the electorate,
expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns, ensuring disenfranchised
voters an effective vote, promoting fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter
participation, and protecting privacy. Id.
35. Id. at 2413. The state interests that the Court felt could possibly be compelling
were promoting fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation, and
protecting privacy. Id.
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found that Proposition 198 was not narrowly tailored to meet the
36
requirements of Tmmons.
Justice Kennedy submitted a concurring opinion.3 7 He applauded
Proposition 198 for its intended effect of increasing voter interest
and participation in California's primary electionsss However, Justice Kennedy recognized that Proposition 198 reached these results
by forcing unwanted candidates on political parties and by altering
39
the parties' basic platform.
Justice Kennedy added that Proposition 198 further violated the
First Amendment rights of the petitioners by imposing restrictions
on the amount of party funds that could be expended to protect
the doctrinal positions of the parties.40 Justice Kennedy rejected the
respondent's argument in favor of Proposition 198, that is, that the
parties use their own funds and resources to support the candidate
of their choice in order to defend the parties' doctrinal positions.
He noted that the Court ruled in Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission41 that this
was not a protected right under the First Amendment. 42 Justice
Kennedy asserted that the Court's decisions in ColoradoRepublican
Federal Campaign Committee and in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
36.
Id. at 2414. The Court suggested that the respondents implement a nonpartisan
blanket primary. Id. The Court believed that a nonpartisan blanket primary would contain all
the benefits of the current blanket primary and would be constitutional. Id. "Under a nonpartisan blanket primary, a State may ensure more choice, greater participation, increased 'privacy,' and a sense of 'fairness' all without severely burdening a political party's First Amendment right of association." Id. at 2414.
37. CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2414.
38. Id. at 2414. Justice Kennedy stated that the supposed purpose behind Proposition
198 of encouraging citizens to vote is an essential and legitimate state interest. Id.
39. Id. at 2415. The results reached through the implementation of Proposition 198 that
Justice Kennedy discussed are the forcing on a political party of an unwanted candidate, and
the alteration of the party's "doctrinal position on major issues." Id. In discussing the reasons
that he joined the majority, Justice Kennedy said, "When the State seeks to direct changes in
a political party's philosophy by forcing upon it unwanted candidates and wresting the
choice between moderation and partisanship away from the party itself, the State's incursion
on the party's associational freedom is subject to careful scrutiny under the First Amendment. For these reasons I agree with the Court's opinion." Id.
40. Id. at 2416.
41. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FederalElection Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604 (1996).
42. Id. at 2415. The Court ruled in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
that the First Amendment denies protection to a political party's spending of its own funds
and resources in cooperation with its own preferred candidate. Id. Without the protection of
the First Amendment, the federal government and the States may, and have, freely regulated
the amount that a party may expend in this capacity. Id. (relying on Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)).

2001

California Democratic Party v. Jones

Government PAC 3 deprive political parties of a right protected by
the First Amendment. 44
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined as to the first part. 45 Justice Stevens stated that Proposition 198 did not violate the First Amendment and that the
majority's view that the First Amendment is a limitation on States
in implementing methods to increase voter participation is wholly
inaccurate. 46 However, Justice Stevens stated that Proposition 198"
when applied to elections for United States senators and representatives raised a more difficult question under the Elections Clause
47
of the United States Constitution.
Justice Stevens stated that basic principles of federalism 4 8 require
the Court to uphold Proposition 198 as an exercise of valid State
power under the Constitution.49 In deciding that a blanket primary
under Proposition 198 did not violate political parties' associational
rights, Justice Stevens discussed the majority's conclusion that a
political party has a "right not to associate."5° Justice Stevens
believed the Court, in reaching this conclusion, distorted two applicable principles.5' The first principle is the difference between a
private organization's right to delineate itself and the State's right to
define the obligations of its citizens and organizations performing
public functions. 52 The, second principle is the difference between
laws that abridge participation and those that encourage participation in the electoral process.e
Justice Stevens agreed with the holding of the district court that
43. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
44. Justice Kennedy in his concurrence cited both Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee and Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC as examples where political parties were deprived of their First Amendment rights. Id.
45. California Democratic Party, 112 S: Ct. at 2416.
46. Id. Justice Stevens stated, "The Court's holding is novel and, in my judgment,
plainly wrong." Id.
47. Id.
48. Federalism is "a term which includes interrelationships among the states and [the]
relationship between the states and federal government." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 612 (6th ed.
1990).
49. California DemocraticParty, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
50. Id.
51. Id. The basic principles Justice Stevens believed the Court wrongly analyzed are
"(1) the distinction between a private organization's right to define itself and its messages, on
the one hand, and the State's right to define the obligations of citizens and organizations performing public functions, on the other; and (2) the distinction between laws that abridge participation in the political process and those that encourage such participation." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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political parties' associational rights are not as absolute as those
enjoyed by entirely private organizations 1 Furthermore, Justice
Stevens relied on the principle that primary elections amount to
state action instead of being merely internal affairs of political parties.55 Because of this state action, Justice Stevens refused to afford
First Amendment protections to political parties in State primary
elections.5
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's creation of the "right
not to associate" should not impose any limits that prevent a State
from opening primary elections to all eligible voters." He believed
that the First Amendment should not be a limit on state-run, statefinanced elections when the State acts to broaden participation in
58
primary elections.
Justice Stevens also suggested that the majority made a factual
error in its determination that blanket primaries burden the associational rights of parties. 59 The dissent deferred to the factual findings made by the district court, stating that reversal was inappropriate because the findings were not clearly erroneous? ° He also
found the State's interest in instituting blanket primaries significant
when balanced with the burden on political parties' associational
61
rights.
The word "association" does not appear anywhere in the wording
of the First Amendment. 62 Courts, however, have recognized that
54. Id. at 2418.
55. California Democratic Party, 112 S. Ct. at 2419. Justice Stevens differentiated
between party caucuses and conventions, that are internal party affairs and receive full protection under the Constitution, and state-run, state-funded primary elections that he believed
are forms of State action. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. Justice Stevens believed that the majority's reliance on Tashjian was incorrect
because, in his view, neither Tashjian nor any other case held that the right not to associate
limits the power of States to open up primaries to all eligible voters. Id.
58. Id. Justice Stevens stated, "When a State acts not to limit democratic participation
but to expand the ability of individuals to participate in the democratic process, it is acting
not as a foe of the First Amendment but as a friend and ally." Id.
59. Justice Stevens used the results in states that have implemented open primaries to
support his finding that open primaries do not burden the associational rights of political
parties. Id.
60. California Democratic Party, 112 S. Ct. at 2422. Justice Stevens deferred to the
factual findings of the district court, especially to the finding that "[t]here will be particular
elections in which there will be a substantial amount of cross over voting .. . although the
cross-over vote will rarely change the outcome of any election and in the typical contest will
not be significantly higher levels than in open primary states." Id. (citing California DemocraticParty, 169 F.3d at 657).
61. Id.
62. For a thorough discussion of the right to associate and the jurisprudence of the
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the First Amendment creates a right of association. 3 The right of
association was first recognized in Justice Harlan's opinion in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.64 In that case, the Court recognized the freedom of association as a distinct and separate constitutional right stemming from the First Amendment. 5 Justice
Harlan also recognized that the right of association was applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
66
Clause.
In Patterson, the state of Alabama attempted to force the
NAACP 67 to hand over to the state attorney general a list of the
names and addresses of its Alabama members.68 The Court ruled
that the production order violated the NAACP's fundamental freedoms protected by the amendments to the constitution.69 In doing
so the court stated, "We think that the production order, in the
respects here drawn in question, must be regarded as entailing the
likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association."70 The
court concluded that disclosure of the membership list would
inhibit people from joining the NAACP and persuade members to
leave the organization because of the likelihood that the publication
of the membership list would lead to "fear of exposure of their
beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences
71
of this exposure."
Likewise, political parties enjoy a constitutionally protected right
Supreme Court prior to CaliforniaDemocraticParty, see Brian M. Castro, Smothering Freedom of Association, 14 ALAsKA L REV. 523 (1997).
63. See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1995). The First
Amendment, while not expressly containing a right of association, does protect certain intimate human relationships, as well as the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those expressive activities otherwise protected by the Constitution. Id.
64. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Justice Harlan held that it
"is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces -freedom of speech." Id. Prior to this case, the Court
had hinted about the possible recognition of the right to association. See, e.g., Sweezy v.
State of New Hampshire by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) and Watldns v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178
(1957).
65. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
66. Id.
67. NAACP stands for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Id. at 451.
68. Id. at 451.
69. Id. at 458.
70. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
71. Id.
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of political association to gather with others for the advancement
of their political beliefs and ideas. 72 The Court in Democratic Party
v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFoUette held that political parties may "identify" the people that make up the association and "limit" the membership in the association to those duly identified. 73
In Anderson v. Celebrezze,74 the Court was asked whether an
Ohio election law requiring an early filing deadline for independent
candidates was constitutionally valid. 75 The Anderson Court enunciated a balancing test to decide the constitutionality of election law
provisions that conflict with associational rights.76 The balancing
test in Anderson contrasts the "character and magnitude" of the
asserted injury to the party's associational rights with the interests
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed
by the statute. 77 The Anderson Court ultimately held that the burden that had been placed on the voter's associational rights
"unquestionably outweighs" the State's minimal interest in imposing
a deadline. 78
The petitioner in Anderson was an independent candidate for
president of the United States who challenged the Ohio rule requiring a filing for candidacy by March of the election year to become
an eligible candidate for the general election in November.79 The
Court found that the rule burdened the voters' associational rights
by limiting the opportunities of independent candidates and Ohio's
72. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). This right grants political parties "the freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and
ideas.... ." Cousins, 419 U.S. at 486. (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973)).
73. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 119 (1981) (quoting
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 514 (1973)).
74. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
75. Id. The statute in question in Anderson required independent candidates to file a
statement of candidacy in March to participate in the general election in November. Id.
76. Id. at 790.
77. Id. In discussing State interests in the balancing test, Justice Stevens stated:
In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make
it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the
reviewing Court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
Id.
78. Id. at 806. The Court in Anderson held, "We conclude that Ohio's March filing deadline for independent candidates for the office of President of the United States cannot be
justified by the State's asserted interest in protecting political stability." Id.
79. Id. at 782. Anderson presented a nominating petition containing approximately
14,500 signatures and a statement of candidacy to respondent Celebrezze, the Ohio Secretary
of State. Id. at 783. These documents would have entitled Anderson to a place on the ballot
if they had been filed on or before March 20, 1980. Id.
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independent-minded voters.80 Quoting from the Court's opinion in
Clements v. Fashing,81 Justice Stevens reiterated, "A burden that
falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent
candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices
82
protected by the First Amendment."
Justice Stevens then balanced the burden on the independent
candidates and voters of Ohio with the asserted State interests of
voter education, equal treatment for partisan and independent candidates, and political stability83 The Court held that the three interests -advanced by the State in support of the early filing deadline
were not enough to validate the burden on the independent candidates' and voters' rights. 4
In Tashjian v. Republican Party, the Republican Party of Connecticut adopted a rule permitting independent voters not affiliated
with any political party to vote in Republican primaries for federal
and statewide offices.8 5 This rule conflicted with the state statute
governing election primaries that required voters in any party primary to be registered members of that party.8 6 The Supreme Court
used the balancing test that it had used previously in Anderson to
invalidate the statute. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, held
that the Connecticut statute as applied to the "Party's Rule" in this
case "deprives the Party of its First Amendment right to enter into
87
political association with individuals of its own choosing."
Connecticut had asserted four interests that it characterized as
80. Anderson, 103 S. Ct. at 792.
81. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 964 (1982).
82. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792 (quoting C/ements, 457 U.S. at 964).
83. Id. at 796.
84. Id. As to the first interest of voter education, the Court stated:
Given modem communications, and given the clear indication that campaign spending
and voter education occur largely during the month before an election, the State cannot seriously maintain that it is "necessary" to reside for a year in the State and three
months in the county in order to be knowledgeable about congressional, state, or
even purely local elections.
Id. at 796 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)).
As to the second interest of equal treatment, the Court acknowledged that an independent
candidate and an ordinary primary candidate are "materially different." Id. at 797. As to the
last State interest, Justice Stevens remarked that the interest in political stability was to protect the Republican and Democratic parties from competition. Id. The Court concluded that
the First Amendment protections outweighed the interest in the protection of two political
parties. Id.
85. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210.
86. Id. The statute provides: "No person shall be permitted to vote at a primary of a
party unless he is on the last-completed enrollment list of such party in the municipality or
voting district .... ." Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-431 (1985)).
87. Id. at 210.
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compelling: minimizing the administrative burden of the primary
system, preventing party raiding, avoiding voter confusion and providing for informed voter decisions, and protecting the responsibility of party government.88 The Court ultimately held that the State
interests advanced in support of the statute were "insubstantial,"
and, as a result, the statute was unconstitutional.8 9
As to the first asserted state interest of minimizing the administrative burden of the primary system, Justice Marshall stated, "the
possibility of future increases in the cost of administering the election system is not a sufficient basis here for infringing appellees'
First Amendment rights."9 0 The second interest of avoiding party
raiding was not applicable to the current situation because Connecticut primary election laws actually permitted independents to
register to vote as late as noon on the business day preceding the
primary. 91 The Court held that the State's interest in avoiding party
raiding had no applicability when compared to the Party's Rule in
question. 92 As to the third asserted state interest, Justice Marshall,
quoting the Anderson Court, remarked, "The State's legitimate interests in preventing voter confusion and providing for educated and
responsible voter decisions in no respect 'make it necessary to burden the [Party's] rights.' "13 Finally, as to the fourth state interest of
protecting the responsibility of party government, the Court held,
"[b]ut on this point even if the State were correct, a State, or a
Court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that
94
of the Party."
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,95
the Party Central Committees brought suit challenging sections of
the California Election Code. which banned primary endorsements
and imposed restrictions on the internal governance of political
parties.9 6 The Eu Court articulated a modified test requiring a statute infringing on associational freedoms to be narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling state interest. 97 When election laws burden a
88. Id. at 217.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
450 U.S.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 224.
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 220 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
Tashjian, 107 U.S. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,
107, 123-24 (1981)).
Eu, 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 224.
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party's right to free speech and free association, they can only survive constitutional scrutiny if they serve a compelling governmental
interest and are narrowly tailored to serve those interests.9 8
The State offered two interests it felt were compelling: stable
government and protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.99 The Court conceded that the first interest of stable government was a compelling interest, but ruled that there was no showing by the State that banning parties from endorsing or opposing
primary candidates advanced this interest. 1°° As to the second interest, the Court cited Tashjian for the proposition that protecting
voters from confusion and undue influence is a compelling state
interest. 10 1 However, the Court reasoned that this interest was not
advanced by a ban on party endorsements because such a ban
actually restricts the flow of information to voters. 10 2 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated, "Because the ban on primary
endorsements by political parties burdens political speech while
serving no compelling governmental interest, we hold that §§11702
and 29430 of the California Election Code violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. " 103
The Eu Court then turned to the restrictions on the organization
and composition of official governing bodies - the limits on terms
of office for state central committee chair and the requirement that
the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern California. 1 4 The Court cited its decision in Tashjian where it held that
"a political party's determination... of structure which best allows
it to pursue its political goals is protected by the Constitution."10 5
The Court further held that these laws burden the political parties
by prohibiting them from governing themselves with the structure
that "they think best."1 6 The Court then proceeded to decide the
issue of whether there was a compelling state interest that would
validate the burden on the parties' associational rights. 0 7
The Court found that the State failed to show that its regulation
98. Id.
99. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224.
100. Id. at 226.
101. Eu, 489 U.S. at 228. The Court stated, "Certainly the State has a legitimate interest
in fostering an informed electorate." Id.
102. Id
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Tashjian, 107 U.S. at 221.)
106. Eu, 489 U.S. at 230.
107. Id. (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973)).
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of internal party governance was necessary to the integrity of the
electoral process.1l 8 It also held that the interest asserted by the
state in the democratic management of the political parties' internal
affairs were not compelling.' °9 In doing so, the Court again quoted
Tashjian: "The State has no interest in protecting the integrity of
the Party against the Party itself."110
In Norman v. Reed,"' an action was brought challenging an Illinois election law on the basis that it violated the associational
rights of new political parties." 2 The statute in question required
the collection of 25,000 signatures to become eligible for statewide
election and another 25,000 signatures for each district within the
State wherein the party wished to gain eligibility. 3 The petitioners
in Norman were attempting to expand the party into a new
county." 4 Also at issue was the right of the Harold Washington
Party to use the name "Harold Washington Party."" 5 Addressing the
signature requirement, the Court stated, "While we express no opinion as to the constitutionality of any such requirement, what we
have said demonstrates that Illinois has not chosen the most narrowly tailored means of advancing even the interest that Reed suggests." 116 In ruling that the Illinois statute restricted the ability to
use the "Harold Washington Party" name, the Court held, "The State
Supreme Court's inhospitable reading of §10-5 sweeps broader than
necessary to advance electoral order and accordingly violates the
First Amendment right of political association."" 7
In Burdick v. Takushi,"8 a registered voter brought suit against
the Hawaii Director of Elections claiming that Hawaii's prohibition
on write-in voting violated voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment
108. Id. at 232.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Tashjian, 107 U.S. at 224).
111. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
112. Norman, 502 U.S. at 279.
113. Id. at 282. The Illinois statute in question in Norman was codified as ILL REV.
STAT., CH. 46 § 10-2 (1989). Id.
114. Id. The Petitioners were attempting to expand their party by establishing it in
Cook County, which comprised two electoral districts including the city of Chicago and the
surrounding suburban area. Id.
115. Norman, 502 U.S. at 284. The statute at issue as to the naming of a political party
is codified as ILL REV. STAT., CH. 46, § 10-5 (1989). The Supreme Court of Illinois held that §
10-5 prohibited the petitioners from using the Harold Washington Party name. Norman, 502
U.S. at 284.
116. Id. at 294.
117. Id. at 290. (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. 793-94).
118. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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rights." 9 Justice White, delivering the opinion of the Court, wrote
that the prohibition, taken as a part of the state's comprehensive
election scheme, did not impermissibly burden voters. 120 The Court
reasoned that:
[A]ll election regulations have an impact on the right to vote,
but it can hardly be said that the laws at issue here unconstitutionally limit access to the ballot by party or independent
candidates or unreasonably interfere with the right of voters
to associate and have candidates of their choice placed on the
ballot.'
Relying on the language from the Norman decision, the Court
stated, "the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." 2 2 The Court
also quoted Anderson and stated, "But when a state election law
provision imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions'
upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, 'the
State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.' "123
The Court, in upholding the constitutionality of Hawaii's provision banning write-in voting, concluded that the burden on write-in
voting was "very limited." 24 The Court realized that because the
burden was limited in this case, the state interest would not need
to be compelling to validate the Hawaii statute. 125 The state interest
advanced by Hawaii was "avoiding the possibility of unrestrained
factionalism at the general election." 126 Justice White found that the
State has a legitimate interest in prohibiting unrestrained factionalism and that enforcing a prohibition on write-in ballots was a
127
rational manner of accomplishing this goal.
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,28 a minor political
119.

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428.

120. Id. at 430.
121.

Id. at 435.

122. Id. (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. 279).
123. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
124. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437. The Court announced, "To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the
entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having
instantaneous access to the ballot." Id.
125. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439.
126. Id (quoting Munro, 415 U.S. at 196).
127. Id. at 440.

128.

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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party brought suit challenging an antifusion 129 law that prohibited
candidates from appearing on the ballot as a candidate of more
than one political party.130 The party asserted that the antifusion
law unreasonably burdened the party's associational rights in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 131 The Court imposed
the balancing test that it first enunciated in Anderson:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the
"character and magnitude" of the burden the State's rule
imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the
State's concerns make the burden necessary. 32
The Court in Timmons concluded that, although the antifusion
law did burden political parties, these burdens were not severe.'
Because the burden was not severe, there was no need to show
that the ban was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. 13 The Court concluded that "[t]he burdens of the antifusion law imposed on the New Party's associational rights were justified by 'correspondingly weighty' valid state interests in ballot
135
integrity and political stability."
The Supreme Court has held in two separate decisions that party
1
rules have primacy over state election law. In Cousins v. Wigoda, 3
the Court was asked to resolve a conflict between a party rule and
state election law 37 In the 1972 Illinois Democratic Primary election, voters nominated delegates to attend the National Democratic
Convention in Miami. 38 Delegates chosen at an earlier caucus,
"Cousins" delegates, filed suit to prohibit the delegates selected at
the Democratic Primary, "Wigoda" delegates, from being seated at
the convention as the representative delegates of the Democratic
129. Fusion is "the nomination by more than one political party of the same candidate
for the same office in the same general election." Timmons, 520 U.S. at 353 n.1.
130. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 353.
131. Id. at 365.
132. Id. at 358 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780).
133. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363. The Court held, "We conclude that the burdens Minnesota imposes on the Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment Associational rights - though
not trivial - are not severe." Id.
134. Id. at 364.
135. Id. at 369.
136. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
137. Id. at 483.
138. Id. at 478.
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Party of llinois. 13 The Cousins delegates alleged that the election
of the Wigoda delegates was improper "on the grounds that... the
slate-making procedures under which the Wigoda delegates were
selected violated Party guidelines incorporated in the Call of the
Convention."14 The Credentials Committee and a hearing officer
determined that the selection of the delegates did violate "party
rules."' 4' The Illinois court issued an injunction against the Wigoda
delegates prohibiting them from representing the party at the
National Democratic Convention.'4
In determining that the injunction imposed by the Illinois court
was proper, Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court, determined that the Party's constitutionally protected right of freedom of
association outweighed the state of Illinois' "interest in protecting
the integrity of its electoral process ... in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party Convention."'" The Court
effectually held that party rules involving the selection of delegates
to attend party conventions have primacy over state election laws
on the subject. 1
In Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,145 the
Supreme Court again decided that a party rule should be given
effect, this time over a Wisconsin election law regarding delegate
selection to a national convention.1 " The rule questioned in La Follette provided that "delegates to its National Convention shall be
chosen through procedures in which only Democrats can participate." 147 The state of Wisconsin instituted a binding primary election in which voters did not declare their party affiliation. 4 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the Democratic Party could
not refuse to sit the delegates; the United States Supreme Court
49
overruled that decision.
The Court found that both the State and the Party had substantial interests in the manner in which elections are conducted and
the manner by which delegates are selected to the nominating con139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cousins, 419 U.S. at 485.
Id. at 491.

144.

Id.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

450 U.S. 107, 126.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id.

862

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:845

vention.w However, the Court held that the State cannot force a
political party to recognize the results of a primary process that
violates a "party rule."151 In doing so, the Court reasoned that the
associational rights of a party and its right to "limit control over
[its] ... decisions to those who share [its] ... interests and persuasions" could not be burdened by the imposition of contrary state
52
election law.
In California Democratic Party, the Supreme Court's decision
that Proposition 198 violated political parties' constitutionally protected right to freedom of association was a large and essential
step toward protecting "party identity."'53 Proposition 198 was, in
effect, an effort to force a change in party identity through the
imposition of a blanket primary system that was designed to favor
"moderate" nominees. 1" By forcing parties to adopt more moderate
candidates, not only do political parties lose their party identity,
but they may also be forced to alter their leadership and views to
such an extent that their continued existence is challenged.'5 This
is especially true regarding minor political parties, but it can also
be very detrimental to the more established and mainstream parties
and their political agendas.
The Court in California Democratic Party realized that the
selection of a political party's nominee by only members of that
party is an essential right protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association. The difference between a political
party and truly "private organizations" complicates the issue of protection under the First Amendment. Political parties are not wholly
public or private organizations; rather, they exhibit elements of
both. Before the California Democratic Party decision, the
Supreme Court had restricted the First Amendment right of freedom of association to situations involving the internal affairs of
those parties. This was probably due to both a lack of justiciable
issues and the fact that political parties are recognized as not
wholly public or private entities.'1 The importance of the Califor150. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 109.
153. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 507.
154. Id. at 2411. The goal of more moderate candidates was the stated purpose of the
OPA. Id. The Court said, "the whole purpose of Proposition 198 was to favor nominees with
'noderate' positions.' " Id.
155. Caifornia Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 507. The CaliforniaDemocratic Party
Court alluded to the drastic effect of Proposition 198 on minor political parties. Id.
156. See supra note 17.
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nia Democratic Party decision lies in the fact that not only was
the right to associate held to protect internal party affairs,'157 but it
was also applied to political parties in State primary elections. The
California Democratic Party holding has effectuated a limit on
States' ability to control their own primary elections, at least when
a statute tailored such as the OPA is in question.
The California Democratic Party Court did not enunciate a new
principle of law in its holding. The Court simply applied the balancing test it used in earlier decisions when confronted with a State
election law that burdens a political party's associational rights.
The Court properly applied the test set forth in Anderson. None of
the seven interests proffered by the state in support of the OPA
were found to justify the burden on the party's associational rights.
In fact, of the seven interests proffered, only four were discussed
by the Court at length. Even if one of the interests had been compelling enough to validate the OPA's intrusion into the party's associational rights, the act would not have survived the strict scrutiny
required by the Court's decision in Timmons. This is so because
Proposition 198 was not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
State interest.
By ruling the OPA unconstitutional, the California Democratic
Party Court delivered a blow to those seeking more moderate candidates. It also provided powerful protection to political parties
against party raiding and cross-over voting. The fear of cross-over
voting was very real in the eyes of the California Democratic
Party majority and cannot be overlooked when analyzing the policy
concerns underlying the Court's decision.
Brian Patrick Bronson

157. Internal party affairs can certainly be considered to be more associated with the
private affairs of an organization, whereas primary elections are more associated with the
public affairs of the party.

